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THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT:
STABILITY WITH(OUT) GROWTH?
Catherine Mathieu1 and Henri Sterdyniak2
1. Introduction
With the launch of economic and monetary union
(EMU), a new frame-work for the conduct of
economic policies in Europe has been implemented.
The ECB’s independence, the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) and the focus on structural reforms show
that‘liberal’views have won over ‘Keynesian’ones.The
weaknesses of this framework soon emerged,
however. The euro area remains a low growth area.
Rigid rules lacking economic rationale have induced
persistent tensions in Europe.
2. An inappropriate framework 
From a Keynesian perspective, independent national
fiscal policies are necessary in EMU because
monetary and exchange rate policies are run at the
euro area level and become ineffective in the event of
asymmetric shocks. Moreover, fiscal policy gains
strength in a monetary union since it will not be
counteracted by interest rate rises or an appreciating
ex-change rate.
Taking the monetarist view, EMU needs binding rules
to constrain fiscal policies. Otherwise, governments
will run over-expansionary policies exactly because
they do not need to be concerned about interest
rates, external balance or speculation on the
exchange rate. This view, supported by central
bankers and the German government, has prevailed
and the SGP focuses on public finance objectives
rather than on economic growth. Hence, the SGP is
not a coordination process,but rather a forced conver-
gence towards a priori norms.
The SGP can also be seen as a way to impose a new
conduct of fiscal policy, in line with what we call the
federal, technocratic and liberal ide-ology (FTLI). This
ideology aims at depriving governments of all lee-
way. It gives them incentives to cut public expendi-
ture and implement liberal structural reforms, while
preventing expansionary macroeconomic policies.
Governments have signed this Pact because they and
their national technocrats share this dominant
ideology. Instead of active economic policies,
European dominant classes favour structural reforms
that increase labour market flexibility, cut taxes and
public expenditure, and increase company profits.
The monitoring of euro area fiscal discipline is based
on three elements: two criteria are inherited from the
Maastricht Treaty (the 3% of GDP deficit threshold
and the 60% reference value for the ratio of debt to
GDP). The third element is the institutional frame-
work for the implemen-tation of fiscal surveillance
(the SGP).
The 3% deficit ceiling is the absolute reference.
However, it has no economic rationale. Why 3%? The
reasons given are awkward. A deficit of 3% of GDP
would stabilise the debt level at 60% of GDP under
nominal GDP growth of 5%. But, apart from the fact
that the reference should then apply to the cyclically-
adjusted balance or to average borrowing over an
economic cycle, why the 60% figure for the debt-to-
GDP ratio? 
Moreover, a country hit by a specific fall in domestic
demand may very well need a deficit higher than 3%
of GDP. A priori, such a deficit will not raise inflation. It
also benefits partner countries by avoiding the
negative impact that would otherwise result from
falling domestic de-mand. In 2003, the public deficit
reached 4.1% of GDP in Germany, but inflation was
low (1.0%) and the current account showed a surplus
(2.1% of GDP). It is difficult to claim that the German
public deficit generated negative spillover effects.
Moreover, the budgetary procedures of the SGP do
not prevent the emergence of excessive inflation. For
example, inflation reached 5.1% in the Netherlands in
2001 while government borrowing was balanced.
In the past, deficits have been higher than 3% of GDP
quite often in many OECD countries. At that time,
they were seen as necessary to support output. In
theory, the discipline the SGP is imposing would not
be so much of a problem if monetary policy were
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more growth-oriented, but this is not the ECB’s remit.
Moreover, a single monetary policy cannot fit
different national cyclical positions. GDP growth and
inflation differ significantly among euro area
economies (see Table 1).With an inflation target set at
2% by the ECB, the interest rate given by a Taylor rule
ranged from 1.5 in the Netherlands to 7.3 in Ireland at
the end of 2005. So the 2% interest rate set by the ECB
was too high for the Netherlands and Germany
whereas it was, although at varying degrees, too low
for the rest of the monetary union.
With a single interest rate, a single public deficit-to-
GDP ratio existing independently of the level of
domestic demand cannot be optimal for each
country.
Table 1: Interest rate, GDP growth and inflation forecasts,
October 2005
The Treaty states the obligation for countries to
keep their public debts below 60% of GDP or other-
wise to bring debt below this ceiling. But as coun-
tries with public debts well above 60% of GDP were
allowed to join the euro area (Italy, Belgium and
Greece), this constraint has been ‘forgotten’ since
1997.
Thirdly, the SGP requires euro area countries to
submit annual stability programmes. The latter
must have macroeconomic and budgetary pro-
jections for the current and three following years,
targeting a budgetary position ‘close to balance or
in surplus’ in the medium-run. However, such a
target has no economic justification. A country in
which private savings are spontaneously too low
(high) may need some budget surplus (deficit).
Moreover, it is reasonable to finance public invest-
ment through borrowing and therefore some public
deficit may be justified. And keeping deficits perma-
nently at 0% of GDP will result in a nominal public
debt in continuing decline as a percentage of GDP.
Here, it needs to be pointed out that there is a
demand for public debt from financial markets,
especially from pension funds that need to invest in
long-term, liquid and safe assets. Finally, eliminating
public deficits and debts may result in very low
interest rates, which would limit the room to act if
the country were to be hit by a negative demand
shock.
At the Ecofin Council of July 2001, Member States
accepted the Commission proposal to set a target of
balanced (as measured by the Commission) struc-
tural budgetary positions. Once this target is
reached, only automatic stabilisers will be allowed
to work, while discretionary policy will be excluded.
Thus, fiscal policies will become automatic and
Member States will lose all fiscal autonomy. The
justification for the proposal was that discretionary
fiscal policy is dangerous because governments can
misjudge the economic situation or permanently
run expansionary policies. Furthermore, the
Commission, pointing to the disincentives on work
caused by taxes, was insisting that public deficits be
reduced through spending cuts and not through
increased taxation.
Ultimately, the SGP does not offer a framework for
coordination of macroeconomic policies. The SGP
does not set a strategy and a target for economic
growth in Europe. Monetary authorities do not take
part in the process. The cyclical position of the
European economy, whether global or country-
specific, is not really taken into consideration.
National programmes are evaluated separately,
without analysing their impact on partner coun-
tries. A satisfactory coordination process would do
the opposite. It would examine precisely the
economic situation of the area as a whole in order
to set the appropriate level of interest rate, and then
switch to the analysis of domestic situations in
order to decide which fiscal policies need to be
implemented at the national level.
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Germany 0.9 1.9 -0.8 -2.7 1.9
France 1.6 1.8 -1.4 -2.1 2.9
Italy 0.3 2.1 -0.4 -2.0 2.5
Spain 3.3 3.3 -4.5 -0.8 6.4
Netherlands 0.9 1.5 -0.4 -4.0 1.5
Belgium 1.6 2.5 -2.1 -1.5 4.0
Austria 2.0 2.2 -2.2 -2.2 3.6
Finland 2.1 1.3 -1.3 0.1 3.2
Portugal 0.9 2.3 -1.2 -4.4 2.7
Greece 3.3 3.3 -4.6 0.5 7.1
Ireland 4.9 2.4 -5.3 -0.6 7.3
Euro area 1.4 2.1 -1.5 -2.3 3.0
(1) Differential between the short-term interest rate (2%) 
and consumer price inflation plus real GDP growth forecasts 
1 year ahead (as of October 2005).
(2) Defined as [π= g + P + 0,5 (P-2) + 0,5 (output gap)]
where g: potential output growth, P, inflation rate and :(x-y) OECD’s
output gap.
Sources: Consensus Economics, OECD (2005),
authors’ calculations.
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3. From 1997 to 2005: the SGP undergoes
reform
3.1. Eight years, twelve sinners
From 1997 to 2000 robust growth and declining
interest rates, together with a small positive fiscal
impulse (0.3% of GDP per year according to the OECD,
see Table 2), allowed public deficits to fall in the euro
area. Public deficits started to rise again in 2001-2002
because of decelerating economic activity and
because the fiscal impulse still remained slightly
positive. Despite the repeated requests of the
Commission, the euro area’s primary structural
surplus decreased over the 1997-2002 period.
Table 2: General government balances in the euro area 
Percentage of GDP
Since the economic slowdown of 2001, the SGP has
generated permanent tensions in Europe. The
Commission has been asking for cuts in public deficits
even as Member States try to support growth in a situ-
ation of high unemployment and weak inflation. The
crisis erupted in November 2003 when the Council
refused to adopt the Commission recommendations
calling on France and Germany to strongly reduce their
structural deficits in 2004 and 2005. The Council then
adopted a less stringent conclusion which was accepted
by the French and German governments. The
Commission however was of the opinion that the
Council did not have the right to refuse its recommen-
dation; procedures and fines should be automatic. So
the Commission put the case before the European
Court of Justice. According to its verdict, Member States
retain the right of appreciation in the excessive deficit
procedure (EDP), but recommendations on excessive
deficits can be modified by the Council only on the
initiative of the Commission. So the Commission and a
qualified majority of the Council must reach agreement.
In September 2004, it came to light that the public
deficit figures provided by Greece had been false since
1997 and that the Greek deficit had never fallen below
3% of GDP. In 2005, deficit figures for Italy and Portugal
were also raised. In December 2005, 12 EU countries
were su-jected to an Excessive Deficit Procedure: five in
the euro area, the UK and six new Member States. In
most new Member States, public deficits are higher
than 3% of GDP, but public debt remains below 60% of
GDP, while these countries also have significant public
infrastructure needs. From 1998 to 2005, the 3% ceiling
has been breached for eight years by Greece, five years
by Italy, four years by France and Germany, two years by
Portugal and one year by the Netherlands.
3.2. On national views
Some countries, like Spain, oppose any change in the
Pact. Spain benefits from robust growth thanks to low
nominal interest rates as compared to domestic infla-
tion and GDP growth, and does not need any ex-
pansionary fiscal policy. However, with inflation at 3.6%
and a current account deficit at 7.4% of GDP for 2005,
Spain is less virtuous than Germany, where inflation is
2.0% and the current surplus 3.8% of GDP. Some small
countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria use
the European disciplinary framework to cut their public
debts and are also opposed to a reform of the Pact.
The larger countries have called for a reform of the Pact.
In November 2004, Silvio Berlusconi called for a Pact
oriented towards growth rather than stability. He
suggested the exclusion of public capital and R&D ex-
penditures from the deficit figures. Gerhard Schröder
claimed that the judgement on excessive deficits
should take account of several criteria,e.g.: the introduc-
tion of reforms that are costly in the short run but boost
growth in the long term; the country’s contribution to
price stability in Europe; the economic situation; the net
contribution to the EU budget and, as concerns
Germany, transfers to new Länder. The French govern-
ment suggested the exclusion of military spending and
aid for developing countries.
Ultimately, European cohesion was at stake in this
discussion. On the one hand, the three largest countries
represent 75% of the euro area population and might
have vetoed a reform. On the other, several smaller
countries accused Germany and France of not
complying with European rules. But some of these
smaller countries receive Community funds, benefited
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1997 -2.6 -0.7 4.5 2.5
1998 -2.3 -0.3 4.2 2.2
1999 -1.3 -0.0 3.6 2.3
2000 -1.0 0.7 3.6 1.7
2001 -1.9 0.6 3.5 0.8
2002 -2.5 0.0 3.3 0.5
2003 -3.0 -0.6 3.1 0.4
2004 -2.7 -0.7 2.9 0.5
2005 -2.9 -1.0 2.8 0.5
(1) Excluding proceeds from the sale of UMTS licences.
Source: OECD (2005).
from falling interest rates when joining the EU and are
less in need of independent fiscal policies than bigger
states because they can more easily implement tax
competition or competitiveness policies, both of which
are harmful strategies at Community level.
3.3. The new Pact
At the March 2005 Council, Member States agreed
on a text prepared by the Commission. The Council
stated that the economic rationale of budgetary
rules had to be enhanced but also that the 3% of
GDP value for the deficit ratio had to remain the
centrepiece of multilateral surveillance.
Part II, ‘Strengthening the preventive arm’, agrees to
the definition of medium-term objectives (MTO) that
are differentiated for each Mem-ber State. But the
range goes only from -1% of GDP for low debt/high
potential growth countries to balance or surplus for
high debt/low potential growth countries.Why wasn’t
the golden rule for public finance considered, or a
deficit stabilising public debt at a reasonable level (i.e. a
structural deficit objective of around 2% for a country
with nominal growth of 4% and a target of 50% for
the debt ratio; and around 3% for a country with
nominal growth of 7.5 % and a target of 40% for the
debt ratio)? 
The implicit liabilities from ageing populations will
be taken into account. However then why not take
the social contributions that people will pay to have a
satisfying level of pension and health insurance into
account as well? Countries with generous public
pensions systems may decide to have a higher tax
burden than countries where employees need to save
on an individual basis in view of retirement or health
spending.
Member States not having reached their MTO should
make a budget-ary effort of 0.5% of GDP per year (cycli-
cally adjusted and excluding one-off measures). The
effort should be higher in periods when the out-put gap
is positive, smaller in bad times. However potential
output and the economic cycle are difficult to assess.
For example, the Commission’s estimates point to
small output gaps. If this is the case, and despite a high
unemployment rate, even a short period of growth
would then lead to an overheating economy.
Structural reforms, in particular pension reforms intro-
ducing a manda-tory, fully funded pillar, will be taken
into account if they raise potential growth and induce
long-term savings in the long run. However shouldn’t
the design of the social security system be a national
choice? There is no justification for a European rule
providing  incentives for a fully funded system.
Part III is entitled ‘Improving the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure’. The Commission will
prepare a report if the deficit exceeds 3%. A small and
temporary breach of the rule will be allowed if it is due
to negative growth or a strong negative output gap.The
proposal tabled by France, Germany and Italy to
withdraw certain categories of expenditure from the
deficit has not been accepted. However, will be taken
account of ‘all relevant factors’ such as policies imple-
mented in the framework of the Lisbon agenda, R&D
spending, public investments, economic situation or
debt sustainability. These elements may prevent trig-
gering of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) but only
if the excess is limited and temporary. They could also
allow for longer adjustment paths to bring deficits
below 3%.Then again,for countries with debts in excess
of 60% of GDP, the Council will take account of the
speed of reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The Commission maintains the right to prepare a report
for each country surpassing the ceiling and will be
entitled to send an early warning directly. But the state
concerned will be entitled to justify its policy by referring
to a number of relevant factors. In other words, imple-
mentation of the EDP will not be automatic. It will
require judgements on the policy choices of the state
concerned. One intriguing question is here how peer
countries can condemn a policy conducted by an
elected government, if this policy generates no negative
externalities?
This agreement may be viewed as a serious weakening
of the Pact. On the other hand, there is no reflection on
the objectives of fiscal policy or on measurement of the
output gap; the easing of the medium term objective is
very limited; the requested annual 0.5% decrease in
structural deficits to GDP ratios remains. Governments
will continue to have to justify domestic fiscal develop-
ments before the Commission and other member
states. The Pact will remain a factor of permanent
tensions in Europe.
The ECB, in particular Otmar Issing, has expressed
strong concerns about the reform, saying that ‘the
conflicts between lax public finances and a monetary
policy centred on price stability would endanger the
construction of monetary union’. But it is difficult to see
how a country with a public deficit, low inflation and an
external surplus, with all of these being the conse-
quence of weak domestic demand, can threaten euro
area price stability.
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4. How to improve the fiscal framework? 
The need for reform of the SGP has generated signifi-
cant literature.
4.1  Fiscal Policy Committees 
Wyplosz (2002) has proposed the creation of a fiscal
policy committee of independent experts in each
Member State. These committees would have the
mandate of ensuring debt sustainability and would
set the level of government borrowing, while public
spending and receipts would remain under the
control of national governments and parliaments.
Fatás et al. (2003) have made a more moderate
proposal: a European Sustainability Council, an inde-
pendent panel of experts, would assess national
fiscal policies according to sustainability criteria.
Their judgment would be made public, to enforce
fiscal discipline through public opinion and fi-
nancial markets. But debt sustainability is a vague
concept that makes sense as a long-term constraint
only and would be difficult to consider for the
conduct of fiscal policy in the short term.
In economic downturns, what trade-off would the
Committee make between output and debt stabilisa-
tion? Could these experts’ judgments replace govern-
ments’ responsibilities? For instance, in 2004, some
European countries chose to run high deficits rather
than depress output further. Could these experts
claim that such policies were not sustainable?
Following on from the ECB’s independence, this
would be a further step towards leaving economic
policy under the responsibility of a technoc-racy.
4.2  Public debt surveillance
Pisani-Ferry (2002), Gros (2003) or Calmfors et al.
(2003) have pointed out that fiscal discipline should
focus on debt rather than deficits, since it is exces-
sively high debt that may threaten the sustainability
of public finances. Without considering the cyclical
effects on debt-to-GDP ratios deteriorating automat-
ically in times of subdued activity, they suggest that
the limit for deficits should depend on public debt
levels. This would be an incentive for member states
to cut public debt in order to get more cyclical
leeway. The proposal puts constraints on highly
indebted countries: Italy, Belgium and Greece. But
the constraint is questionable for Italy and Belgium
where public debt has a counterpart in a high house-
holds’ savings ratio. The constraint comes in addition
to the objective of a medium-term balanced budget,
which already implies a continuing decrease in the
public debt-to-GDP ratio.
Old-age-related public spending – pensions and
health – will increase under the effects of ageing
populations in the EU in the near future. Some econ-
omists (among them Pisani-Ferry 2002 and Oksanen
2004) suggest that each country should evaluate
and make public the implicit debt level of its public
pension and health systems, in addition to financial
debt. What should the implicit debt include? Why
not include also public education spending entitled
to newborn children? In any  case, anticipated
receipts should be considered too, like taxes and
social contributions. The proposal paves the way to a
never-ending process of complicated calculations
surrounded with a high degree of uncertainty.
Indeed, the estimated level of implicit debt relies on
many assumptions concerning future retirement
age and pensions levels. The implicit debt level may
be greatly reduced, effectively or fictively, if the
country announces in advance that the level of
pensions will be lowered or that the retirement age
will be postponed (as France did in 2003). Ultimately,
the real question is not to aggregate financial public
debt and implicit social debt but to determine
whether fiscal policy is sustainable and optimal. If
house-holds benefit from a high, well managed and
useful level of social spending, they may accept a
high level of contributions.The burden could even be
less heavy than having to pay insurance premiums
to inefficient or unreliable private companies.
Many economists (among them Delbecque 2003,
Oksanen 2004) and the Commission think that the
SGP rules are justified by the future rise in pension
spending. Their view is that public debt needs to be
significantly reduced now to ensure the future
pensions. This is necessary for inter-generational
equity reasons (all generations sharing the tax
burden) as well as economic efficiency (avoiding
imposing too heavy a tax burden on future genera-
tions). However, the fundamental rationale and
objective of the Pact is to facilitate fiscal policy coor-
dination and to avoid negative externalities inside
monetary union, and not to give technocrats the
power to set what they think are optimal fiscal
policies for each country.
4.3  The golden rule for public finances
Public investment has positive return effects over a
longer time period and it is therefore logical for it to
be financed over a similar period of time.
Independently of short-term stabilisation concerns,
government budgets should be split into a current
budget - including spending related to public capital
stock depreciation - which should be balanced, and
an investment budget, financed through borrowing.
The British government adopted such a rule, the so-
called ‘golden rule for public finances’, in 1998.
Several economists (Modigliani et al. 1998, Creel et al.
2002, among others) have suggested importing this
rule into the euro area.The structural current govern-
ment balance, i.e. excluding public investment,
should be permanently balanced or in surplus. If the
objective is to keep public debt at the level of public
capital stock, which may be judged de-sirable from
an intergenerational equity point of view, the golden
rule must be that the cyclically-adjusted borrowing
should be in balance with net public investment
(Mathieu/Sterdyniak 2004).
The golden rule allows governments to borrow to
invest, which is of paramount importance for coun-
tries with significant investment needs like the new
Member States. According to endogenous growth
theory, cuts in public investment negatively affect
potential output growth. However, the golden rule
approach opens a Pandora’s box on the definition of
public investment: should the national accounts
definition be the reference, or should all expenditure
preparing the economy for the future, like education
or research, be also taken into account, as proposed
by Fitoussi (2002)? 
The golden rule defines fiscal policy neutrality,
cyclical neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are
allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public
savings equal public investment). However, a
government may decide not to be neutral. It may
wish to implement an expansionary fiscal policy in
times of slow growth or to run a contractionary
policy in a period of high inflation. It may wish to
implement structural measures if it thinks that
savings are too high ex ante (which would necessi-
tate an excessively low interest rate) or too low (in
the light of demographic changes). As with the
existing rule, there is no certainty that application
of the golden rule results in a fiscal policy stance
which, given the level of interest rates at the level
of monetary union, delivers a satisfying level of
output in the member state.
4.4. Reforming European economic governance
and improving policy mix
The European fiscal and monetary framework is a
highly political issue. What powers should be in
national or community hands? It is also a tech-
nical issue: a single monetary policy and different
fiscal policies need to be consistent with one
another.
An elected economic government of Europe, making
fiscal decisions for all, is currently a utopia. The
democratic debate has remained at the national
level while at the same time business cycles as well
as institu-tions still differ from one country to
another.
Given the current level of European political integra-
tion, governments must keep their prerogative on
national fiscal policy. The European surveillance of
member states’ economic policies should be limited
to preventing any national fiscal policy from nega-
tively affecting the rest of the area. That is why
binding rules should bear directly on externalities.
Thus, the rule should be that countries are allowed to
implement the fiscal policy of their choice, as long as
it does not affect the macroeconomic equilibrium of
the area, in other words as long as domestic inflation
stays in line with the inflation target of the area. For
example, one could think of an inflation target being
set between 1.5% and 3.5% in the area. ‘Northern’
countries could then choose a target within 1 and 3%,
while lagging countries would target an inflation
rate between 3 and 5%. In such a framework, a
country hit by a negative demand shock would be
able to counterbalance it through an expansionary
fiscal policy. Conversely, a country hit by inflationary
pressures would have to implement restrictive
measures.
The European authorities – the Commission and the
Ecofin Council of the euro area – would be respon-
sible for checking that inflation remains at the level
set in each country, and possibly accepting some
deviations and adjustment periods in the event of
specific or common shocks.The European authorities
could also be responsible for checking that domestic
public debts do not put the sustainability of public
finances at risk, or that no country runs an exces-
sively large current account deficit relative to the
area current account balance.
However, this framework does not set the respective
roles of monetary policy and fiscal policies. A satis-
fying level of global demand may be obtained
through a combination of high interest rates and
public deficits, or of low interest rates and public
deficits. The second combination will lead to higher
private investment and therefore will be preferable
in terms of medium-term output growth. In other
words, the compatibility between monetary policy
and fiscal policies has to be organised. In our view,
the best rule is the following: monetary and fiscal
policies should set a common objective aiming at
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the convergence of real interest rates and output
growth. For example, if long-term real interest rates
are higher than output growth, this implies that
investment is too weak. In that case, monetary policy
should cut interest rates and should be accompanied
by restrictive fiscal policies in those countries where
the interest rate cut would raise inflation excessively.
National fiscal policies should be responsible for
managing the inflation-production trade-off in each
country while monetary policy should target the
interest rate.
In addition, it would be desirable to set up economic
policy coordina-tion in the framework of the
Eurogroup, which would maintain a dialogue with
the ECB. This coordination should not focus only on
public finance balances, but should aim at
supporting economic activity and achieving the 3%
growth target of the Lisbon strategy. It should be
kept in mind that improving the European fiscal
framework is not merely a technical issue, but
requires a new alliance between social classes con-
cerned about full employment and social cohesion.
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